Discussion of Preston, "Learning about monetary policy rules when long-horizon expectations matter" by Seppo Honkapohja
 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
Discussion of Preston, “Learning about Monetary Policy Rules 









The discussant comments were presented at the Monetary Policy and Learning Conference sponsored by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta in March 2003. The views expressed here are the author’s and not necessarily those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta or the Federal Reserve System. Any remaining errors are the author’s responsibility. 
 
Please address questions regarding content to Seppo Honkapohja, Department of Economics, University of Helsinki, P.O. 
Box 54 (Unioninkatu 37), FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland, 358 (9) 191-8876, seppo.honkapohja@helsinki.fi. 
 
The full text of Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta working papers, including revised versions, is available on the Atlanta Fed’s 
Web site at http://www.frbatlanta.org. Click on the “Publications” link and then “Working Papers.” To receive notification 
about new papers, please use the on-line publications order form, or contact the Public Affairs Department, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, 1000 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309-4470, 404-498-8020. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 




Discussion of Preston, “Learning about Monetary Policy  
Rules when Long-Horizon Expectations Matter” 
 
 






Abstract: The design of interest rate rules for conducting monetary policy have recently been examined for two 
key concerns. The first issue is determinacy of equilibria. Indeterminacy (multiplicity of stationary rational 
expectations equilibria) is a concern in models of monopolistic competition and price stickiness are currently a 
popular framework for the study of monetary policy. The second issue is stability of equilibria under adaptive 
learning. Some interest rate rules do not perform well when the expectations of the agents get out of 





cently been examined for two key concerns. The ﬁrst issue is determinacy
of equilibria. Indeterminacy (multiplicity of stationary rational expectations
equilibria) is a concern in models of monopolistic competition and price stick-
iness are currently a popular framework for the study of monetary policy. The
second issue is stability of equilibria under adaptive learning. Some interest
rate rules do not perform well when the expectations of the agents get out
of equilibrium, e.g. as a result of structural shifts.
Both determinacy and learning stability can be seen criteria for good
monetary policy.1 The recent literature has shown that the form of the in-
terest rate rule is important in facilitating the learning process of the private
agents. In adaptive learning economic agents are assumed to use an econo-
metric model to forecast the future and they update their forecast functions
as new data becomes available. In any period, the forecasts are input to
1
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 agents’ behavioral rules. The decisions of the agents are obtained by com-
bining the forecasts and the behavioral rules and these decisions lead to a
temporary equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in the current period given the
forecasts and the agent’s decisions.
The formulation of agents’ behavioral rules outside equilibrium is a major
issue in the learning approach. Much of the literature has assumed that Euler
equations under subjective expectations, which are a key part of individual
ﬁrst-order optimality conditions, provide the behavioral rules of the agents.
The behavioral rules based on Euler equations are forward-looking but they
look forward only one period ahead. Nevertheless, these rules have often
been used even if the horizon of the agents is in principle inﬁnite.2 One-step
forward-looking behavioral rules are a relatively crude way for representing
individual behavior under the changing circumstances in adaptive learning.
The one-period ahead margin is a key margin of optimality but one can
envisage that longer horizons can also matter.
2 Preston’s Contribution
The central contribution of (Preston 2003) is the reformulation of individual
behavioral rules for standard models of monetary policy in a way that gives
a role to long-horizon forecasting. This is a useful contribution even if ear-
lier papers have done the same in other contexts (see footnote 2 above).Let
me brieﬂy outline Preston’s methodology using a simple permanent-income
model for illustration.3
There are two parts to the description of the agent’s behavior. The agent’s
current decisions in terms of forecasts is logically the ﬁrst part. Preston’s
approach consists of the following steps.
1. Formulate the household decision problem over the inﬁnite future and
derive the standard optimality conditions, i.e. the Euler equation and
the intertemporal budget constraint.
2Behavioral rules with an inﬁnite or a long ﬁnite horizon have appeared in earlier
literature. See the iterated Euler equation in (Sargent 1993) pp.122-145, the zero proﬁt
condition in (Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer 1998) and the asset holding functions in
(Bullard and Duﬀy 2001).
3For formal details see Section 2 of (Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans 2002).
22. Linearize the Euler equation and the intertemporal budget constraint
at a nonstochastic steady state.
3. Iterate the linearized Euler equation and compute planned consump-
tion for each future period s as a function of current consumption and
anticipated interest rates in periods up to s − 1.
4. Substitute the iterated Euler equations into the linearized intertempo-
ral budget constraint and solve for current consumption.
These steps yield a behavioral rule for current consumption decisions in terms
of the inﬁnite horizon sequence of variables that are exogenous to the agent.
The second part to agent’s behavior is the description how forecasts are
made. In any period the agent has an estimated linear econometric model
for the variables that he needs to forecast and its parameters have been
estimated from past data. Given knowledge of some exogenous variables
the agent computes the required forecasts using the estimated model. For
the longer horizon forecasts the agent is assumed to iterate the econometric
model forward using the current estimated values of the parameters.
These two parts give the decisions of the agents for the current period.
Market clearing then yields the temporary equilibrium. The equilibrium
provides a new data point for the agents in the economy and they re-estimate
the parameters of the econometric model and the learning process continues.
The story about temporary equilibrium and parameter updating is exactly
the same as in the other literature on adaptive learning, see e.g. (Evans and
Honkapohja 2001).
Formulation of Inﬁnite-horizon behavior rules is clearly going to be im-
portant for some applications, though it may perhaps be less central in other
situations. Let me ﬁrst make a remark about extending it. I will then make
some comments on the current paper.
Linearization is a major limitation in Preston’s model. It means restrict-
ing attention to dynamics in a small neighborhood of the nonstochastic steady
state and, in particular, it must be assumed that shocks to the economy are
small for otherwise nonlinearities can be important. One could try to avoid
the linearization. In some cases assuming a parametric form, say, for the
utility function can make possible the derivation of a full consumption func-
tion in terms of perceived wealth and its diﬀerent components. If this is
successfully done, adding speciﬁc assumptions about the stochastic process
for the interest rate and other relevant future variables would allow the study
3of more global aspects of learning dynamics for economic policy. Doing all
this could provide interesting perspectives, especially when wealth variations
and changing perceptions about the components of wealth are important.
3 Discussion
Preston studies the implications of assuming that agents have inﬁnite-horizon
behavioral rules in an economy operating under an given instrument rule for
setting of the interest rate. He considers both rules which respond only to
exogenous shocks and Taylor rules that respond to inﬂation and the output
gap. Preston ﬁnds that the Taylor principle is necessary and suﬃcient for
stability under learning and that rules responding only to shocks lead to
instability. These results are exactly the same that (Bullard and Mitra 2002)
derived for the same model, except that in (Bullard and Mitra 2002) the
agents’ behavioral rules were based Euler equations, i.e. agents had only
short horizons. Let me call the two approaches inﬁnite horizon (IH) and
Euler equation (EE) learning.
Preston’s results are a useful robustness check of the (Bullard and Mitra
2002) recommendation that the interest rate instrument rule should respect
the Taylor principle.4 This is a worth while undertaking since we know rel-
atively little about the behavioral rules that individual agents might have
outside a full intertemporal equilibrium. I do not ﬁnd the result very sur-
prising as the paper just considers local learning stability of equilibrium in
an unchanging environment.
I do not have a full understanding of the connections between EE and IH
learning. Let me just oﬀer some tentative comments about the EE and IH
approaches and suggest that some of Preston’s discussion is misleading.
My ﬁrst point is that both approaches represent plausible models of
boundedly rational behavior. IH learning is based on more elaborate in-
dividual optimization reasoning than EE learning, but it is still not optimal
behavior. It is assumed that the agents ignore the fact that during the learn-
4In a companion paper (Preston 2002) considers optimal interest rate setting under
IH learning, which was studied by (Evans and Honkapohja 2002b) under EE learning.
He ﬁnds that learning stability obtains when the interest rate rule is derived from the
correctly speciﬁed model, including agents’ behavioral rules, and taking the values of
private forecasts as given. The latter key principle was ﬁrst suggested in (Evans and
Honkapohja 2003).
4ing dynamics the estimates of the forecast function parameters will change
over time. If the agents are sophisticated about planning over the inﬁnite
horizon,.they might well have anticipations about future parameter change
and e.g. estimate separate forecast functions over the longer horizons.
Second, EE learning and IH learning are not inconsistent. Indeed, it is
possible to derive the equations of the model with EE learning under plausible
assumptions from Preston’s basic behavioral rules (5) and (11) under the sim-
ple assumption that agents have identical subjective expectations.5 Preston
mistakenly claims that obtaining the EE learning framework in this applica-
tion, shown in his equations (28)-(29), requires use of “knowledge that other
agents’ consumption decisions satisfy a subjective Euler equation” (p.2). In
fact, all that is required is that (1) agents have identical expectations, which
Preston also assumes, and (2) Ci
t = Yt = xt +Y n
t for all i and t. Concerning
the latter, it should be noted that, with identical preferences and technology
we have Ci
t = Yt in temporary equilibria as a result of market clearing. Since
this equality has held in the past, it is natural for the agents to make the
forecast ˆ Ei
tCi
t+1 = ˆ Ei
txt+1 + Y n
t+1,w h e r eYt = xt + Y n
t is just a deﬁnition.
Third, while IH learning makes elaborate use of the consumers’ subjective
intertemporal budget constraint and EE learning does not use it at all, this
does not imply that EE learning is necessarily inconsistent with this budget
constraint. The consumer formulates current demand behavior by looking
only at the (subjective) optimality margin one period ahead. Nothing is
assumed about the further future. Moreover, if the economy converges to
the rational expectations equilibrium, then the transversality condition must
hold ex post in this kind of model also under EE learning. This is simply a
matter of iterating forward and aggregating the ﬂow budget constraints and
making use of market clearing.
Fourth, let me take up Preston’s argument that EE learning ignores the
wealth term (see Section 6 of the paper). This is misleading since also EE
learning would take any wealth variation into consideration if the forecasting
required it for the EE behavioral rule. See e.g. the analysis of the Ramsey
model in Section 4.4 of (Evans and Honkapohja 2001).
These comments show that EE and IH learning are both possible ap-
proaches to study the learning behavior of the economy under a Taylor in-
5Details are given in Section 3 of (Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans 2002), where an
earlier version of Preston’s equation (5) was used. It did not have the wealth variable ￿i
t,
but see the remarks below.
5terest rate rule satisfying the Taylor principle (to achieve convergence). The
diﬀerence between EE and IH learning lies in the ultimately empirical ques-
tion of the nature of individual behavioral rules outside equilibrium. I do
not have strong views on the behavioral rules that are appropriate. Let me
just suggest that the behavioral rules are likely to depend on the nature of
outside-equilibrium situations that the agents encounter. If the economy is
in a constant stable regime, one might expect that agents use simple rules
of thumb and do not consider what happens at long horizons. They do not
have strong reasons to look at long horizons.
On the other hand, it is easy to envisage situations where boundedly ratio-
nal agents would have a clear interest in considering long horizons. Consider
a model with government spending, taxes, debt, money and inﬁnitely lived
agents. Suppose that the government announces that it will do a major
tax cut in the future for a ﬁxed number of periods, ﬁnance this by issu-
ing debt and return to balanced budgets after the ﬁxed number of periods
with deﬁcits. This announcement would give a strong reason for a bound-
edly rational agent to consider long horizons. The IH learning approach or
its nonlinear generalization would be a natural tool to study the resulting
learning dynamics.
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